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Il lavoro analizza le scelte finanziarie delle imprese nei paesi dell’Unione europea
utilizzando i dati di bilancio di un campione di imprese residenti nell’area dell’euro (esclusa la
Germania) e del Regno Unito.
L’analisi econometrica mostra che il grado di leverage è correlato positivamente con la
dimensione delle imprese e la capacità di fornire garanzie e negativamente con l’età e la redditività.
La quota di debito a lungo termine è positivamente correlata con la durata degli investimenti e con
la capacità delle imprese di fornire garanzie reali.
Il contesto istituzionale del paese di residenza dell’impresa è importante nel determinare la
struttura finanziaria, soprattutto per le imprese più piccole e non quotate, per le quali l’accesso al
mercato dei capitali è più difficile.
Le imprese risultano sistematicamente più indebitate nei paesi con mercati borsistici poco
sviluppati. Inoltre, lo sviluppo dei mercati obbligazionari contribuisce ad allungare la scadenza delle
passività delle imprese. La mancanza di garanzie reali, che caratterizza soprattutto le imprese che
investono in attività immateriali, come la ricerca e sviluppo, riduce l’accesso al credito soltanto nei
paesi che non proteggono adeguatamente i diritti dei creditori. Inoltre, l’efficienza delle istituzioni
giudiziarie è importante sia per garantire l’accesso al credito, sia per allungarne la scadenza.
Il limitato sviluppo del mercato borsistico e l’inefficienza delle istituzioni giudiziarie
possono, pertanto, contribuire a spiegare l’alto indebitamento e l’elevata quota di debito a breve
delle imprese italiane.DO BETTER INSTITUTIONS MITIGATE AGENCY PROBLEMS?




This paper examines how firm characteristics, the legal system and financial
development affect corporate finance decisions using a novel and unexplored data set
containing balance sheet information for listed and unlisted companies. Contrary to the
previous literature, by using data on unlisted companies of small dimension, the paper shows
that institutions play an important role in determining the extent of agency problems in
corporate finance decisions. In particular, it emerges that in countries with good accounting
standards and above-average creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible
assets to obtain loans. Therefore, institutions that are capable of effectively protecting
lenders are good substitutes for collateral. The protection of creditor rights is also important
for guaranteeing access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile
returns. In contrast, if the law does not guarantee creditor rights sufficiently, lenders prefer to
issue short-term debt because they can use the threat not to renew the loan to limit
entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior. In this case, inefficiencies due to the excessive
liquidation of projects in temporary difficulty may arise.
Ceteris paribus, firms are more leveraged in countries where the stock market is less
developed. Moreover, unlisted firms appear systematically more indebted even after
controlling for firm characteristics, such as profitability, size and the ability to provide
collateral. Finally, institutions, which favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement,
are associated with higher leverage, but also with greater availability of long-term debt.
JEL classification: G32, O16, L14
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One of the channels through which financial development may spur economic growth
is by providing easier and cheaper access to external finance to firms with high growth
potential. This paper investigates whether there are any financial system characteristics and
institutional arrangements that more effectively deal with market imperfections. To this end,
I examine whether corporate finance decisions, which depend on firm characteristics, differ
across countries owning to differences in legal rules and the degree of financial market
development.
The empirical literature on corporate finance has shown that financial decisions
indeed depend on firm’s attributes which proxy for the extent of agency problems, such as
the availability of collateral (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Barclay and Smith, 1995). Cross-
country comparisons of the determinants of corporate finance choices by focusing on large
listed companies have failed to point out relevant differences (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
This paper shows that the importance of institutions in mitigating agency problems emerges
most when observing smaller unlisted companies, since large listed companies with easier
access to international capital markets are more alike and have access to similar sets of
financial instruments. Data on smaller unlisted companies reveal that there exist institutional
arrangements that make it easier to convey funds to R&D expenditure, advertising and other
intangible assets, which are particularly important for firms’ growth but which cannot be
provided as collateral. In fact, in countries with good accounting standards and above-
average creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans.
Furthermore, the protection of creditor rights turns out to be important for guaranteeing
access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns. If the law
does not guarantee creditor rights sufficiently, lenders may prefer short-term debt in order to
control entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior by threatening not to renew the loan. Better
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protection of creditor rights makes unnecessary to use debt maturity to control borrowers.
Interestingly, the protection of creditor rights is important for guaranteeing access to credit
and lengthening debt maturity only with regard to unlisted companies investing in intangible
assets and with highly volatile returns; these sources of agency problems do not appear to be
significant for the subsample of listed companies.
Firms are more levered in countries where the stock market is less developed and this
makes bankruptcy more probable. Moreover, unlisted firms are systematically more
indebted, even after controlling for firm characteristics such as profitability, size and the
ability to provide collateral.  Institutions, such as the degree of enforcement and investor
protection are important even after controlling for the degree of financial market
development. Legal rules favoring creditor rights and stricter enforcement are associated
with higher leverage and also with greater availability of long-term debt.
This paper is closely related to recent research showing that legal rules, degree of
investor protection and enforcement are important determinants of the size of capital
markets, share returns, externally-financed firm growth and R&D expenditure (La Porta et
al. 1997 and 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996 and 1998; Carlin and Mayer
1998; Lombardo and Pagano, 1999).  However, these studies only examine the aggregate
implications of laws and institutions. This holds also for Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1999) who examine how leverage and the maturity structure of debt differ across countries
according to the level of financial market and institutional development. Even if they control
for firm characteristics, they exploit only the cross-country variability. Consequently, they
can only conclude that debt is on average of shorter maturity in countries where the quality
of enforcement is lower but do not have anything to say on the effects of the quality of
institutions on particular agency problems, because no attempt is made to address how the
interaction between institutional differences (e.g. creditor protection) and cross-sectional
firm characteristics (e.g. availability of collateral) affects agency problems and,
consequently, financing decisions.
 The objective of this paper is to fill this gap using a large data set containing listed
and mainly unlisted firms from eight European countries. I examine how institutions affect
leverage and debt maturity by exploring how the significance of different imperfections
varies across countries that differ in institutions and equity and bond market development.11
I first use firms’ fixed effects regressions on leverage and debt maturity to study the
interaction between firms’ and financial systems’ observable characteristics. Afterwards, I
analyze the distribution of firms’ fixed effects. These are a sort of  “core leverage” and “core
debt maturity”, which cannot be explained by time-varying firm characteristics such as age,
size and profitability. These “core measures” are used to examine differences in financial
decisions across countries, across financial systems, across sectors and between listed and
unlisted companies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the firm characteristics
relevant to explain leverage and maturity structure based on the theoretical literature on
corporate finance. Section 3 briefly describes the data set. The statistical model, the results
and the sensitivity analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Institutions, agency problems and external finance
A rich theoretical literature exists on how asymmetric information affects firms’
financing choices and the distortions that arise in investment financing when information is
less than perfect and contracts are incomplete.
 2 Firm characteristics, such as age, size and
the share of tangible assets, are important proxies for the level of asymmetric information in
borrower-lender relationships and, therefore, they affect financing choices. The importance
of agency problems is likely to differ across countries according to their legal rules, the
efficiency of their legal systems and the degree of financial development, in the same way as
market capitalization and stock returns differ at the aggregate level (La Porta et al., 1997).
I explore the impact of agency problems in different financial systems by focusing on
two indicators of financial structure:
1.   leverage, defined as the ratio of financial debt (which comprehend both bank
loans and bond) to the book value of equity (including shareholders’ funds, reserves
and other provisions) plus financial debt;
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2.  maturity structure of debt, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to external
funds.
 This section briefly examines the main theories of capital structure and identifies the
attributes that are expected to affect firms’ access to debt finance, measured by the debt-
equity ratio and debt maturity. It also discusses how the relative importance and the effects
of these factors are likely to differ across countries with different legal environments.
The relevant firm attributes, their expected relation to leverage and debt maturity and
the proxies for financial system characteristics used in the empirical analysis are discussed
below.
2.1  The determinants of leverage
2.1.1 Reputation
The reputation to be a good borrower is expected to make access to external funds
3
and, in particular, to debt cheaper and easier. Age is often considered a proxy for a
borrower’s reputation in debt markets because it takes time to build credit history and be
recognized publicly as a good risk if there are adverse selection problems. Firm’s maturity
also helps to overcome moral hazard problems. Mature borrowers have incentives to choose
less risky projects because once they have earned a reputation for creditworthiness, it is more
costly for them to default, since their reputation is also at stake (Diamond, 1989). Therefore,
if information asymmetries are relevant, leverage is expected to increase with firm age
because mature firms are perceived as less risky and the premia they pay are therefore lower.
On the other hand, firms are likely to need more external funds to finance expansion
at the beginning of their life cycle. As the entrepreneur accumulates wealth, external funds
may be substituted with cheaper internal sources of funds, according to Myers’ well-known
pecking order theory of finance (Myers, 1977). In this case, a negative relation is expected
between leverage and age. Determining which effect is more relevant is an empirical
question.
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Even if the pecking order theory holds, the relation between leverage and age will
also depend on the degree of bond market development which influences the availability and
the cost of external funds. Bank debt costs significantly more than market debt; hence, firms
may wish to substitute bank loans with bonds, when internal funds are not sufficient to
finance their investment opportunities. The choice of different credit sources is influenced by
the firm’s reputation. As pointed out by Diamond (1991) and confirmed by several empirical
studies (Fluck et al., 1997), there is a life-cycle effect in borrowing from intermediaries. New
borrowers initially must borrow from banks because they lack reputation; they may issue
debt directly only at a later stage, when the borrower credit record they acquired when being
monitored by banks is used to predict their future actions when not monitored. The level of
bond market development determines whether market debt is a real alternative and therefore
influences corporate finance decisions. This is true even if firms do not actually use market
debt, because the existence of this alternative influences the cost of bank debt in equilibrium.
Even if the data do not allow us to distinguish between borrowing through
intermediaries and market debt, we can still analyze the effect of the life cycle on leverage.
Ceteris paribus, in countries with deep bond markets, leverage should decrease by less with
age once firms have acquired a sufficient reputation (i.e. they are sufficiently mature),
because there are other sources of credit that are cheaper than bank loans.
To summarize, if the pecking order theory holds, leverage is expected to decrease
with age in the first life-cycle phase, when bank debt is the only source of external funding.
After a firm has accumulated a sufficient reputation, its behavior is expected to vary
depending on whether the bond market is sufficiently developed. In countries with deep
bond markets firms can substitute away from bank loans and use cheaper market debt.
Therefore, they are expected to reduce their leverage by less than in countries where the
bond market is very thin and there is only limited possibility to substitute bank loans with
other sources of credit.
In the empirical analysis, in order to capture the effect of reputation on leverage, I
introduce the logarithm and the square of the logarithm of firm age. In this way, I can
capture non-linearities in the relationship between firm age and leverage and, in particular,14
different impacts of age on leverage for young and mature firms.
 4 Moreover, to evaluate
how this effect differs across countries according to the degree of bond market capitalization,
I distinguish countries with deep bond markets from countries with thin bond markets by
using data on the ratio of bond market capitalization to GDP. In particular, since the exact
level of bond market capitalization is not relevant for the objectives of this analysis, but it is
only important whether or not market debt is a real option for firms, I use a dummy equal to
one if the bond market capitalization is greater than the average of the sample countries.
Since the relation between firm maturity and leverage is expected to differ across countries
only after firms become sufficiently mature to issue market debt, the coefficient of the
variable obtained by interacting this dummy with the square of the logarithm of firms’ age
alone (and not with the linear term) is expected to be positive and significant.
2.1.2 Firm size and risk
Riskier firms need to pay higher risk premia and are often subject to problems of credit
rationing, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). As a consequence, they are expected
to be less indebted.
Since large firms are likely to be more diversified and less subject to problems of
adverse selection, because they are more visible, a widely used proxy for firm risk is size.
  Leverage may also be positively related to firm size because issuing and direct
bankruptcy costs, which involve fixed costs, constitute a smaller share of firm value as the
latter increases. However, for similar reasons involving greater transparency and the
existence of fixed costs, large firms have easier access to equity markets and therefore can
more easily use equity rather than debt to finance their investment opportunities. In this case,
the correlation between leverage and size is expected to be negative. Once again,
determining which effect is dominant is an empirical question that may also depend on
whether or not a firm is listed and on the level of stock market development in the country of
incorporation. In the empirical analysis, firm size is measured by the logarithm of the
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number of employees and its effect on leverage is analyzed distinguishing between private
and public companies.
2.1.3 Collateral
Whatever the perception of external financiers as to the quality of a firm, the ability
to provide collateral makes it easier to obtain loans. In the presence of asymmetric
information, issuing debt secured by assets of known value helps to reduce its cost (Myers
and Majluf, 1984). This causes distortions in investment financing because intangible assets,
such as R&D expenditure, advertising costs and organizational and maintenance
expenditure, cannot be used as collateral. Moreover, since this type of investment is not
visible to outside lenders, entrepreneurs may be tempted to divert funds for personal gain
and debt-holders may be fearful to be expropriated. As a consequence, firms investing more
in intangible assets, which are often those with higher growth opportunities, have less access
to credit.
Are there any characteristics of financial systems that make credit more easily
available to firms investing in intangible assets and help abate this agency problem? There
should be a smaller need for collateral in countries where accounting standards are high.
Higher accounting standards should mitigate adverse selection problems and therefore firms
investing more in intangible assets should have easier access to debt. However, for any given
level of asymmetric information, lenders’ ability to recover their loans remains an important
factor. If creditors are inadequately protected by the law and the judicial system, they still
may wish to secure their loans with collateral, thus discriminating against firms investing in
intangible assets.
To account for these cross-country differences in the empirical analysis, the ratio of
intangible assets to total assets, which is used to measure the intangibility of the assets of a
firm, is interacted with a measure of the quality of creditor protection.
2.1.4  Growth opportunities
Growth opportunities may be considered as assets that cannot be secured.16
Ideally, financial systems should convey funds to firms with high growth
opportunities. Therefore, in countries where the stock market is undercapitalized and firms
seldom issue new capital, high growth prospects should be positively correlated with
leverage.
On the other hand, debt creates agency problems between debt-holders and
shareholders because equity-controlled firms may invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth
from debt-holders. As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), equity-
holders may have incentives to invest in high-risk projects, which do not maximize the
present value of profits, or profitable investment opportunities may be forgone because they
are unprofitable for very leveraged firms. Furthermore, firms in growing industries may have
even more flexibility in their choices of future investment and the agency problem between
borrowers and lenders may be accentuated. This may result in a negative correlation between
growth opportunities and leverage, as has been found in several empirical studies (see, for
instance, Lang et al., 1996).
This type of agency problem should be less important for firms in which ownership,
as measured by the equity share held by the first shareholder, is more concentrated. In fact,
controlling shareholders are likely to reap private benefits from control and to internalize the
negative effects of a higher probability of bankruptcy from investment in excessively risky
projects. Moreover, they may want to avoid the issue of new shares for fears to lose the
firm’s control.
In what follows, firms’ growth opportunities at time t will be measured alternatively
by the growth rate of value added and the growth rate of sales between t and t+1. As this
variable may be endogenous and therefore cause inconsistency of the estimates, I also use
the average growth rate of firms in the same sector and the same country of firm i to study
the relation between growth opportunities and leverage. These variables will be used in
conjunction with stock market capitalization and ownership concentration measured by the
first shareholder share. In particular, if the opportunity to issue new capital, measured by the
stock market capitalization to GDP, is relevant, one would expect a negative impact on
leverage of the variable obtained by interacting the measure of growth opportunity with
stock market capitalization. In contrast, firms in which ownership is more concentrated
should increase leverage if their growth opportunities improve.17
2.1.5  Free cash flow vs. pecking order theories
According to the “pecking order” theory of financing of Myers (1984), the
availability of internal funds is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage because
firms first try to finance new investment internally and, only after, with debt since this is
costlier due to market imperfections.
However, if there are conflicts of interest between managers, whose objective is the
expansion of the firm, and shareholders, whose objective is to maximize a firm’s value, high
cash flow firms and, in general, firms with large amounts of internal funds may be more
leveraged because this reduces the free cash flow and, therefore, limits the opportunities of
managers to finance value-reducing investment (Jensen, 1986).
To evaluate which effect prevails, the availability of internal funds will be
determined alternatively by measures of profitability, as the return on assets and the return
on equity, and measures of the availability of internal funds, such as the ratio of the cash
flow to fixed assets.
2.1.6  Tax distortions
Finally, tax distortions, such as tax deductions, must be considered. In fact, besides
minimizing financing costs, profit maximizing firms aim to maximize tax shields and this
may introduce distortions in the choice between debt and equity. High non-debt tax shields,
such as depreciation deductions and tax credits, may be considered substitutes for the tax
benefits of debt financing and should discourage firms to request loans. Consequently, such
tax shields should be associated with lower debt/equity ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988).
In the empirical specification, non-debt-tax-shields have been proxied by the ratio of
depreciation to value added net of labor costs.
2.2  Debt maturity and return volatility
Given the degree of leverage, what determines debt maturity? According to the
traditional approach, the maturity of liabilities should be matched to the maturity of assets. In18
fact, financing long-term projects with short-term debt may cause illiquidity problems and
the premature liquidation of profitable projects. Myers (1977) provides another reason why
value-maximizing firms should match the maturity of their assets and liabilities. At the end
of an asset’s life, the firm faces a reinvestment decision. Issuing debt that matures at the
same time helps to reestablish the appropriate investment incentives when new investment is
required and to avoid underinvestment due to excessive indebtedness and conflicts of interest
between debt-holders and shareholders.
Ceteris paribus, firms with more tangible assets, which can secure loans, should have
easier access to long-term debt.
The literature on incomplete contracts offers another appealing explanation of the
choice of debt maturity. According to this theory, the debt contract is a device used to
transfer control from shareholders to debt-holders in the states of the world in which the firm
does not make repayments. Short-term debt is thought to help lenders to limit opportunistic
behavior in bad states of the world because they can acquire control by denying loan
renewals. In this way, lenders can limit the possibility that managers dissipate the firm’s
assets. On the other hand, lenders are probably less informed about the firm’s prospects than
managers or entrepreneurs. Therefore, they may confuse temporary illiquidity with
insolvency and force an inefficient liquidation of a firm that otherwise would be profitable in
the long run (Rajan, 1992). Long-term debt ensures firms that credit lines will not dry up
when they experience temporary difficulties that otherwise could result in permanent
liquidation.
The resolution of this trade-off may depend on the uncertainty to which a firm’s
business is subject and on degree to which institutions protect creditor rights. In sectors with
volatile returns, firms are more likely to incur losses and creditors may prefer to lend short-
term if they feel that their rights are at risk. In contrast, if the legal system protects creditor
rights, lenders may not need to shorten debt maturity as volatility rises and this would help to
avoid the inefficiencies deriving from the excessive liquidation of projects in temporary
difficulty.
In what follows, the variance of the return on assets in the firm’s country and sector
at time t is used to measure a firm’s return volatility at time t. I will analyze how the19
coefficient of this variable varies across countries, according to the quality of protection of
creditor rights. If the degree of protection is relevant, higher volatility should be associated
with longer debt maturity in countries where creditor rights are better protected.
Finally, the relation between leverage and debt maturity is analyzed in order to
answer the following question. Are highly indebted firms forced to accept short-term debt, or
the more indebted firms are the ones who can get loans more advantageously? In Section 4, I
try to respond to all these question.
3.  Data
Information on firms is from the 1997 version of Amadeus (Analyze Major Database
from European Sources) Database by Bureau Van Dijk. These data are complemented with
proxies for investor rights around the world and measures of the depth of market
capitalization taken from La Porta et al. (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1999).
3.1   Firm level data
Amadeus provides balance sheet information for firms with minimal size
requirements (either sales greater than 10 million euros or more than 150 employees or total
assets greater than 10 million euros) from 1993 to 1997 for 26 European countries.  The
database contains information on about 150,000 non-financial firms. Bureau Van Dijk
standardizes balance sheets information in order to achieve uniformity and to enable cross
border analysis.
Besides Amadeus, Bureau Van Dijk offers a collection of databases which includes
Bankscope and Global Researcher and are commonly used by banks and consultancies for
credit management, research of potential markets, competitors analysis and merger and
acquisitions analysis. Bureau Van Dijk claims to provide its product also to business schools,
which use the databases for research information without online charges.
  The panel of firms in Amadeus is very unbalanced and many observations are
missing. Since I want to focus on specific items of the balance sheet, I restrict my analysis to
eight European countries for which there is more detailed information. These are Belgium,
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK.20
A preliminary analysis of all the firms for which total liabilities and financial debt
are reported and greater then zero shows that there are no major differences in the value-
weighted average leverage across countries (Table 1), in accordance to the findings of Rajan
and Zingales (1995). Interestingly, the differences are more striking within countries
between listed and unlisted companies. Differences in debt maturity are pronounced both
across countries and between listed and unlisted companies, as the weighted average of
short-term debt to total financial debt demonstrates in Table 2. The value-weighted average
return on assets also varies significantly across countries (Table 2).
These descriptive statistics must be interpreted very cautiously because the number of
firms considered differ al lot across countries and their characteristics vary substantially: the
firms differ considerably in size and the sample is not necessarily representative of the
distribution of size within the population. This heterogeneity among firms may be the
determinant of different corporate finance choices rather than the capability of a given
financial system to deal with market imperfection. Therefore, the international comparison
of capital structures is meaningful only after controlling for firm characteristics.
For this reason, in the econometric analysis, I focus on the subsample of firms for
which at least intangible assets, the number of employees, and sales are reported. As shown
in Table 3, this considerably reduce the number of the firms used in the econometric analysis
to 33,855 firms, which are not necessarily present for all the five years. I rely on
unconsolidated balance sheets and in any case the observations on firms with an
unconsolidated companion are less than 3 per cent.
Firm size, measured by the number of employees, varies greatly across countries: the
median number of employees is 65 in Italy as against 125 in the UK. There is also a lot of
variance in firm characteristics, as shown in Table 4, which summarizes the average age, the
ratio of intangible assets to total assets, the real growth rate of sales, the real growth rate of
value added, the return on assets, the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities, and
leverage for all the firms used in the empirical analysis, grouped by country (the standard
deviation is reported in parenthesis).21
3.2  Indicators of the legal environment and financial development
As mentioned above, the institutional variables are taken from two principal sources:
the variables which proxy for different legal rules and the quality of enforcement are from
La Porta et al. (1998), while the proxies of financial development are from Rajan and
Zingales (1999). In addition to using indicators of financial development which measure the
availability of financial instruments such as market debt and which therefore have an impact
on corporate finance decisions, I also use variables that proxy for the quality of laws and
regulation and the promptness of their enforcement, which may have an independent effect
on the relevance of different sources of agency problems.
 5
Financial development is measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP
and bond market capitalization
6 to GDP. All values refer to 1996. One of the advantages of
using firm level data is that the problem of the endogeneity of financial development does
not arise, as this can certainly be considered exogenous with respect to the individual firm.
The institutional variables include the quality of a country’s accounting standards
measuring the rigor of company reports, the protection of creditor rights warranted by a
country’s laws and regulations, which provides a measure of how easily creditors can
repossess collateral and the control of the firm in case of default, and a measure of
enforcement, which is important because laws and regulations protect creditors only to the
extent that they are actually enforced. All these are presented in Table 5. Details on how
these indicators are constructed can be found in La Porta et al. (1998).
According to the classification of La Porta et al., the financial systems of the firms in
my sample are of English and French origin. Notwithstanding all countries in the sample are
high-income industrial countries with developed financial systems and a relatively high
degree of enforcement, institutional differences do exist. For example, Italy has very
underdeveloped bond and stock markets, average protection of creditor rights and good
accounting standards (above the average of the countries in the sample). On the other hand,
the UK has highly capitalized markets, excellent accounting standards and highly protected
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creditor rights relative to the other countries; in France creditor rights are poorly protected,
the markets for bonds and equity are thin and accounting standards are high. These
institutional differences are sufficient to capture possible differences in the behavior of firms
with similar characteristics across countries because I can exploit also the cross-firm
variability. In this way, I can check if there are significant differences in the impact of
certain firm characteristics (such as the lack of collateral) across countries with high creditor
protection, like the UK, and low creditor protection, like France. In what follows, I use the
values of the previous indicators of institutional development and also the dummy variables
associated with these indicators, which group countries above and below the average of the
samples used in Rajan and Zingales (1999) and La Porta et al. (1998).
4. Estimation method and results
As discussed in Section 2, leverage is expected to be influenced by firm
characteristics, which proxy for the extent of various market imperfections, such as age, size,
profitability, non-debt-tax-shields, investment in intangible assets, and growth opportunities;
debt maturity should be explained by leverage itself, the time horizon of firm investment, the
ability to provide collateral and the sectoral variability of earnings. These variables are
interacted with the indicators of institutional and financial development in order to evaluate
their impact on different agency problems, as explained in Section 2.
The system of equations I estimate is the following:
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1it it 4





it 2 it 1 0
+ )   (
assets   fixed
assets   intangible
ε α
α α α α α α
shields tax
size growth age age Leverage i it
+
+ + + + + + =
(2)
,
+ ) Volatility (Return 
2 it 4




leverage of assets) (maturity  Maturity
ε β
β β β β
+
+ + + =
where  N i ,..., 1 =  refers to individuals,  T t ,..., 1 =  to time periods. The error terms  1it ε  and
it 2 ε  are independently and identically distributed and uncorrelated with the explicative
variables.23
To take into account firm cross-sectional differences that are not observed or
invariant over time, such as the geographical location and the productive sector, I use firm
fixed effects in both equations. These firm specific effects also help to control for data
problems due to the way in which balance sheets are reclassified in Amadeus. Even if there
are cross-country biases in the way in which provisions are treated, they are not likely to
vary much over time and, therefore, the conclusions regarding the effects of firm
characteristics on corporate finance decisions are not affected.
The fixed effects estimator provides unbiased estimates of the parameters of interest
by taking all the variables in deviation from the individual mean and exploiting only the
within group variability. I also take into account that firms’ leverage and the ratio of short-
term debt to the total external funds are jointly determined. Therefore, ordinary least squares
in the equation for debt maturity may be inconsistent since leverage may be correlated with
the residuals. To account for these endogeneity problems, I estimate the equation for debt
maturity using two stages least squares.
Finally, since most of the variance of leverage and debt maturity is accounted for by
the variation in individual fixed effects, I also study how fixed effects vary across countries
according to the level of financial development and enforcement and between listed and
unlisted companies. The coefficient of the firm specific intercept, which can be recovered
from the fixed effects estimates
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where  1 Z  and  2 Z  are two matrices of time-invariant explicative variables of dimension
N g × 1  and  N g × 2 , respectively, and  1 a  and  1 b  are the vectors of the parameters of interest
with dimension  1 1× g  and  1 2 × g , respectively. Ordinary least squares provide consistent
                                                          
7 After estimating the equation  it it i it x y ε β α + + =  using the fixed effects estimator, the estimates of the
individual fixed effects may be recovered as follows:  i i i x y β α ˆ ˆ − = , where  i y  and  i x  are individual time
averages.24
estimates of the coefficient of the time invariant variables as N goes to infinity, as long as the
error terms,  1 u  and  2 u , are not correlated with the explicative variables.
 8
I also estimate the equations for leverage and debt maturity using the lagged values
of the explicative variables in order to check for eventual endogeneity problems. Since the
results are qualitatively similar, I present estimates using the contemporaneous values of
firm characteristics; otherwise, the time series variability would decline further, which would
be problematic since the fixed effect estimator only depends on the time series variability of
the observations.
The results are presented in the following two subsections. Ordinary least squares
estimations of the equations of interest are also presented for comparison purposes.
 9
4.1  Leverage
The estimates of the coefficients of the equation for leverage are presented in Tables
6 to 9. Besides fixed effect estimates, ordinary least squares estimates are presented for
comparison.
For the most part, the coefficient estimates are of the expected sign and significant
and it is always possible to reject the null that the individual fixed effects are not significant
with a level of confidence of more than 1 per cent. Moreover, data seem to support the view
that the financial system characteristics affect the extent of agency problems.
The determinants of leverage and the differences across different financial systems
are described below.
In almost all the specifications both the coefficients of age and age square are
negative and statistically significant. They are also economically relevant: the percentages of
the standard deviation of leverage explained by the linear and the quadratic term are 11 per
                                                          
8 A detailed description of this two-stage method  to estimate the effect of time-invariant individual
characteristics may be found in Hsiao (1986). Hausman and Taylor (1981) apply this methodology to estimate
the returns to education.25
cent and 42 per cent, respectively. Therefore, the data support Myers’ pecking order theory
rather than the reputation acquisition effect. In fact, mature firms use relatively less debt and
substitute away from debt at an increasing pace as they age (the square of the logarithm of
age is negative and significant). They do not seem to take advantage of their acquired
reputation as they become more mature, but prefer either to use internal wealth to decrease
leverage or to issue new capital, if they go public.
Interestingly, as expected, mature firms reduce leverage faster in countries where
bond markets are not highly capitalized. The coefficient of the logarithm of the square of
firm age interacted with the dummy that is equal to 1 for firms incorporated in countries with
highly capitalized bond markets is positive and significant in all the specifications.
 10
Therefore, if highly capitalized bond markets exist, as in the UK and in the Netherlands,
firms have the option to issue market debt when they are sufficiently mature and leverage
decreases more slowly, either because the relatively costlier bank loans are substituted with
bonds or simply because the mere existence of an outside option decreases bank rates. As the
theoretical models on the choice between bank loans and market debt based on reputation
predict, the effect of a highly capitalized bond market is irrelevant in the early stage of a
firm’s life, since the dummy that distinguishes across countries with different bond market
capitalization is not significant, if interacted with the linear term.
 11
The ability to provide collateral seems important to guarantee access to credit. The
coefficient of the ratio of intangible assets to total assets is negative and significant (Table 6,
column 5). Firms with mostly intangible assets are also less leveraged in countries with good
accounting standards. High accounting standards, which reduce asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders, are not sufficient to mitigate the agency problems due to the
lack of collateral: if I interact the share of intangible assets over total assets with the
                                                                                                                                                                                  
9 Estimates obtained using the between estimator, which is equivalent to an ordinary least squares
regression using cross-firm averages, were qualitatively similar to OLS estimates and, therefore, have been
omitted.
10 This variable, like the previous two, is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant, as
its beta coefficient is 43 per cent.
11 Estimates are omitted for brevity.26
accounting standards dummy, I obtain a positive but not significant coefficient (Table 6,
column 3).
 12
In contrast, in financial systems whose legal rules are of English origin, like the UK,
intangible capital intensive enterprises are not discriminated against; in fact, the coefficient
of the ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets interacted with the dummy English origin is
positive, significant and partially offsets the negative coefficient of the ratio of intangible
assets to fixed assets (Table 6, column 4). Further investigation reveals that good creditor
protection favors investment in intangible assets (UK is characterized by very high
accounting standards and excellent protection of creditor rights).
 13 If I create a dummy that
is equal to 1 if the index of protection of creditor rights is above average and zero otherwise
and if I interact it with the share of intangible assets, I obtain a coefficient that is positive and
significant (Table 6, column 2). These effects are also economically significant: if the level
of tangible assets to total assets increases by one standard deviation, leverage decreases by
more than 7 per cent in countries with poor protection of creditor rights and by 3.9 per cent
in the others. Since associating countries like Italy with the UK with regard to the protection
of creditor rights may be very controversial, I also use the value of the index of La Porta et
al. (1998) instead of the dummy variable as an interaction variable; the results remain
qualitatively unchanged. Since most of the countries in the sample have good protection of
creditor rights, the negative correlation between the ratio of intangible assets to fixed assets
and leverage seems to be due principally to French firms. This result coupled with the fact
that the stock market capitalization is quite low suggests that funding investment in
intangible assets may be difficult in France.
Future growth opportunities may be considered another intangible asset requiring
external finance. Contrary to previous studies, fixed effects estimates show that firms
become more leveraged as their growth opportunities improve. This effect is weaker, the
higher the stock market capitalization, which is apparent from the negative and significant
                                                          
12 In addition to Ireland and Portugal, I also tried to include Belgium and Italy among the countries with low
accounting standards, as indicated in Table 5, and to use the actual value of this indicator instead of the dummy
variable; the coefficient of the interaction term was never significant.27
coefficient of the variable obtained by interacting stock market capitalization and the growth
rate. The higher the stock market capitalization, the greater possibility firms have to issue
new shares instead of debt to finance their investment opportunities. High-growth firms are
less indebted in English origin financial systems (estimates omitted). This explains why the
existing studies on the relation between growth and leverage, which have used mainly
samples of large US companies, find a negative correlation between growth and leverage.
The results are qualitatively invariant whether I use the real growth rate of sales or that of
value added to measure growth opportunities (Table 7). Moreover, restricting the sample to
firms for which information on the ownership share of the main shareholder is available, it
appears that firms with more concentrated ownership are more inclined to finance growth
with debt. In column 2 of Table 7, the coefficient of the rate of growth of value added
interacted with a measure of the ownership share of the main shareholder is positive and
significant.
These results might be criticized because the growth rate of the individual firm may
be endogenous: firms which obtain more credit may be able to grow more, even if ex ante
they did not have better growth opportunities. To overcome this problem, I measure growth
opportunities using the average growth rate at time t of all the firms in the same sector and in
the same country of firm i. The results are qualitatively invariant but the variance explained
by the model decreases (Table 7, column 3). This supports my view that the results are not
spurious owing to inconsistency problems.
Interestingly, if one recovers the cross-sectional variability from ordinary least
squares regressions, the negative effects of future growth on leverage emerges as noted by
several previous empirical studies (see, for instance, Lang et al., 1996), also after controlling
for endogeneity problems, by using the average growth rate in the sector at time t. Therefore,
even if firms use debt to exploit growth opportunities, on a cross-sectional basis, the firms
that grow more are also those with smaller leverage. Surprisingly, in countries with highly
capitalized stock markets, high-growth firms are more indebted when cross-sectional
variability is used. This is due to the subsample of unlisted firms since the ordinary least
                                                                                                                                                                                  
13 Note that in my sample all the countries with high accounting standards also have high creditor
protection, but the converse is not true. Therefore, I cannot identify whether high accounting standards are28
squares coefficient is significant only for this subsample (Table 8), which cannot issue new
equity. Therefore, high stock market capitalization has an indirect effect on unlisted firms’
leverage, as it seems to make more credit available to firms which do not recur to the stock
market to raise capital.
Discrepancies between fixed-effects and OLS estimates also emerge in the coefficient
of firm size, measured by the logarithm of the number of employees. The coefficient of the
number of employees is significant and positive in all the specifications when the fixed
effect estimator is used. Moreover, there are no relevant differences between listed and
unlisted firms (estimates have been omitted for brevity). Since fixed-effects regressions only
exploit the time-series variability in the sample but ignore the information deriving from
systematic differences across firms, this result implies that leverage grows as firm size
increases. In contrast, from the ordinary least squares estimation, which more heavily
weights cross-section variability, the coefficient of size is negative and significant.
Moreover, it appears that this is due to differences between listed and unlisted companies
because, distinguishing between the two, the coefficient of the number of employees is
positive and significant for listed companies, but negative and smaller in absolute value for
the unlisted companies. The negative coefficient of pooled OLS regressions uncovers the
systematic differences between public and private companies. Unlisted firms are usually
smaller and generally more indebted, as one would expect, since they cannot issue new
capital to finance their investment opportunities. Moreover, on a cross-sectional basis, there
does not seem to be any improvement in the evaluation of their risk by outside investors as
they grow in size: the data show a negative partial correlation between size and leverage.
The opposite holds for listed companies. The larger the firm, the more levered it is.
Therefore, they seem to exploit the economies of scale due to their size by issuing new debt
rather than equity. Using the fixed effect estimator, systematic differences between private
and public companies are captured by the fixed effects and the positive relation between size
and leverage emerges.
Profitability, measured either by the return on assets or the return on equity and the
ratio of cash flow to total assets, is always negatively correlated with leverage (for brevity,
                                                                                                                                                                                  
necessary to reduce agency problems for firms investing in intangible assets.29
estimates have been presented only for the return on assets). As noted above, this is perfectly
consistent with pecking order theories, as firms prefer to use internal finance before turning
to external funds. In fact, internal finance is always cheaper, since it is not subject to agency
problems. There is no support for the competing theories of free cash flow.
I also control for non-debt related corporate tax shields, proxied by depreciation to
value added net of labor costs; the coefficient is always insignificant and close to zero.
The signs of the coefficients and, usually, also their significance remain qualitatively
similar if I run the regressions for sub-samples of firms that differ in size (Table 9). In
particular, I group the firms by number of employees, distinguishing between firms with
fewer then 50 employees, firms with at least 50 but fewer than 200 employees, firms with
200 to 1000 employees and firms with more than 1000 employees.  Interestingly, the share
of intangible assets is not significantly negatively correlated with leverage for companies
with more than 1000 employees and for listed companies.
I also group the firms by sectors (Table 9). All the previous results still hold for firms
in the more “advanced” sectors (i.e. sectors with high growth opportunities and where
investment in intangible assets is important). In contrast, when more traditional sectors, such
as agriculture or paper product, where intangible assets are less important, are considered
individually, the previous results no longer hold.
Finally, I check if there are any countries that disproportionately influence the previous
results by dropping each country one by one. No differences emerge when I exclude smaller
countries or UK. However, Italy and France, the two most represented countries, do
influence the results. This is not surprising. Italy, for instance, has the lowest ratio of stock
market capitalization to GDP in the sample and in order to study the effects of stock market
capitalization on corporate finance decisions in such a small sample of countries, the
observations on Italy are necessary.
In all the previous regressions, most of the variance is explained by the variation in
individual fixed effects. Hence, there are systematic cross-sectional differences in leverage
across firms and, possibly across countries that do not depend on the time varying firm
attributes considered. It may be useful to analyze how this “core leverage”, measured by the
coefficients of firm dummies, depends on country and firm characteristics that do not vary30
over time. As shown in Table 11, the most important variable in explaining the variance of
individual fixed effects is stock market capitalization: as the beta coefficient (the bold
numbers in Table 11) makes clear, if stock market capitalization increases by one standard
deviation, ”core leverage” decreases by more than half of its standard deviation. This
confirms the expectation that if firms are able to issue new shares they use less debt to
finance investment.
Ceteris paribus, firms are less indebted if the banking system is highly concentrated,
maybe in order to escape banks’ market power. Not surprisingly, leverage is higher in
countries with highly capitalized bond markets and listed firms are systematically less
indebted then unlisted companies, as is consistent with studies that find that firms usually
reduce their leverage after going public (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998) by issuing new
capital.
Finally, as expected, firms are able to obtain more debt finance in countries where
creditors’ rights are better protected and enforcement of law is higher.
I introduce sectoral dummies: these are generally significant, but the fit of the
regression increases only marginally (R2 increases less than 2 per cent).
As a robustness check
14, I regress the individual fixed effects on country and sectoral
dummies alone (without introducing variables which proxy for the quality of financial
institutions). Interestingly this provides almost the same fit (the value of R2 is comparable),
but it is less parsimonious and does not help identify the possible determinants of the
differences in leverage.
Interestingly, all the results on the sign and significance of coefficients of both first and
second stage regressions hold if I estimate an equation with time-varying and time-invariant
firm characteristics by ordinary least squares.
                                                          
14 All the estimates on robustness are omitted for brevity.31
4.2  Maturity structure
To gauge the differences in financing decisions across countries not only is leverage
important, but also the maturity structure of debt. As has been noted above, the ability of
lenders to exercise control differs with short-term and long-term debt. Moreover, investment
choices may vary according to the maturity of the funds a financial system can provide and
this influences aggregate growth which is higher if long term funds are available, as shown
by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 10. According to the traditional
theory, debt maturity must match asset maturity.  Indeed, the coefficient of the ratio of fixed
assets to total assets, used to measure the maturity of assets, is significant and has the
expected sign: firms do try to match the maturity of their assets with that of liabilities.
However, this is not the only determinant of debt maturity. There are other firm
characteristics that are significant. Data seem to suggest that firms that are able to obtain
more loans because of their reputations as “good borrowers” also have easier access to long-
term finance: high leveraged firms have relatively less short-term debt. The estimation
method allows us to exclude that this is because firms tend to be more indebted if they have
access to long-term debt. In fact, I estimate the equation for debt maturity using two-stages
least squares. The use of the exogenous variables as instruments for leverage also ensures
that the correlation is not due to a spurious common shock.
Furthermore, the ability to provide collateral, measured by the ratio of tangible assets
to fixed assets, lengthens debt maturity.
Debt maturity is also expected to depend on the volatility of firms’ returns. The way
in which the trade-off between excessive liquidation, which is more likely when debt is
short-term and returns are highly volatile, and creditors’ fears of asset dissipation, which is
favored by long-term debt, is resolved is an empirical question. The answer may well depend
on institutions. The effect of volatility on the ratio of short-term debt to total liabilities is
positive but not significant when one pools all the firms of the sample without distinguishing
by country or by the degree of protection of creditor rights. Interestingly,  when one
distinguishes by country according to the degree of creditor protection, debt maturity
decreases as the volatility of the return on assets increases (the coefficient is positive and32
significant) only in countries where creditors’ rights are relatively less protected. In contrast,
in countries where creditor protection is above average, the volatility of returns has no effect
on debt maturity. In fact, the coefficient of the variable defined as the variance of the return
on assets multiplied by a dummy equal to 1 if creditors’ protection is above average is
negative and significant. Moreover, the hypothesis that its magnitude is equal in absolute
value to the coefficient of the variance of returns cannot be rejected. Therefore, in countries
with high creditor protection, volatility has no effect on debt maturity. This helps firms to
access long-term debt in sectors with high return variability and to avoid problems of
excessive liquidation. These results remain qualitatively unchanged if I use the level of the
index of protection of creditor rights rather than a dummy variable as the interaction
variable.
Interestingly, the subsample of listed companies seems less subject to agency
problems. In this case, the availability of collateral, as measured by the share of tangible
assets to total assets, is not significant and it is not possible to identify any negative effect of
volatility on maturity, even in countries with low creditor protection. The results are
invariant when I group firms by size, as I did for the equation for leverage, even though the
effect of the variance of returns on maturity is not significant for large firms (those with
more than 1000 employees); the results are omitted for brevity. Furthermore, neither the sign
nor the significance of the coefficients changes when countries are individually omitted to
check for robustness.
 In the equation for maturity structure, as in that for leverage, most of the variance
remains unexplained (R2 is 4.5 per cent) and is accounted by variation in the individual fixed
effects. Therefore, the analysis of the individual fixed effects seems necessary in this case as
well.
From the regression of fixed effects on firm and country characteristics, which are
invariant over time, it emerges that in countries with deeper stock markets firms obtain less
long-term debt: the higher the stock market capitalization, the more equity is an effective
substitute for long-term debt. Furthermore, the debt maturity of listed companies is always
longer. This may be due to the fact that listed companies are more likely to choose public
debt to bank debt, which usually has shorter maturity. Moreover, publicly quoted firms are
usually more transparent because they must disclose more information in order to be listed33
and because share prices reveal information to creditors. This makes listed companies less
risky and explains their ability to obtain more long-term debt. Therefore, in countries with
highly developed stock markets, access to long-term debt becomes even more difficult for
unlisted companies.
As a general rule, debt maturity is longer in countries where recourse to market debt
is greater and in countries where banks are less concentrated. The finding that the ratio of
bond market capitalization to GDP is positively correlated with debt maturity may also be
due to the fact that bonds substitute bank loans, which are mostly short-term, because
frequent renewal decisions allow intermediaries to maximize the effectiveness of
monitoring, an activity in which banks have a comparative advantage over other private
lenders.
The proxies for legal institutions and, in particular, for the capability of investors to
protect their investments, are significant even after controlling for the degree of financial
development. Debt maturity is longer when laws are better enforced and creditor rights better
protected. This result confirms the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).
As in the equation for leverage, variables which proxy for differences in financial and
legal institutions explain core maturity as well as country dummies and they are more
parsimonious. Moreover, all the results of first and second stage regressions are confirmed
by the OLS estimation of the equation for debt maturity with both time-varying and time-
invariant firm characteristics.
5. Conclusions
This paper examines how firm characteristics, the legal rules and financial
development affect corporate finance decisions in eight European countries. Several
important differences regarding the availability of finance to firms investing in intangible
assets and debt maturity emerge. Firms that invest more intensively in intangible assets are
less penalized for lack of collateral in countries with good creditor protection and high
accounting standards. Well-protected creditor rights also help to lengthen debt maturity for
firms in sectors with highly volatile returns, and thus may help to avoid distortions due to the34
excessive liquidation of firms in temporary difficulty, which is often associated with
frequent short-term debt renewal decisions.
Highly protected creditor rights may improve financing opportunities primarily for
unlisted companies, as lack of collateral and volatility of returns do not seem to affect the
financing choices of public companies significantly.
Furthermore, the analysis helps to identity some features of the financial system that
seem to be responsible for the observed patterns of corporate finance decisions. The low
quality of law enforcement in Italy is definitely a contributory factor to the very short
maturity of Italian firms’ liabilities; in France, the low quality of creditor protection makes it
more difficult for firms investing in intangible assets, such as R&D, to obtain debt finance.
The analysis could be valuably extended to a larger sample of countries. The
consideration of both developing and developed countries would increase the cross-country
variance and would provide a greater range of institutional differences to study how the
extent of agency problems depends on institutions.
Moreover many issues regarding the choice between bank loans and market debt
remain unexplored because the data set does not provide this information. However, this
paper provides an indirect analysis of the choice between market debt and bank loans over
the firm’s life cycle. It emerges that in countries where the bond market is underdeveloped,
leverage decreases faster as firms become older. Very likely, this is due to the fact that firms
cannot substitute more expensive bank loans with market debt. Further investigation of this
point deserves attention, since low bond market capitalization, which is often coupled with
an undercapitalized stock market, may constrain firm growth owning to a lack of cheap
sources of external finance.Table 1
COMPARISON OF THE EXTENT OF LEVERAGE ACROSS
DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
Leverage measures are calculated for all firms in the database in 1997. Debt to capital is the
book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and equity. Aggregate ratios are
obtained by summing the numerator across all reporting firms in the country and dividing by the
denominator summed across the same firms. The number of firms per category in each country
is within parenthesis.
Debt to Capital
All companies Listed companies Non listed companies
 Belgium 0.51
(no. of firms:: 6452)
0.33
(no. of firms: 109)
0.55
(no. of firms: 6198)
 France 0.49
(no. of firms:: 18551)
0.40




(no. of firms: 182) – 0.58






(no. of firms: 13666)
 Netherlands 0.46
(no. of firms:: 1135)
0.33
(no. of firms: 2)
0.55
(no. of firms: 1052)
 Portugal 0.56
(no. of firms:: 2078)
0.35
(no. of firms: 8)
0.55
(no. of firms: 1906)
 Spain 0.51
(no. of firms:: 10118)
0.44
(no. of firms: 165)
0.52
(no. of firms: 9190)
 United Kingdom 0.65
(no. of firms:: 13756)
0.27
(no. of firms: 99)
0.67
(no. of firms: 12611)Table 2
DEBT MATURITY AND PROFITABILITY
All measures are calculated for all firms in the database in 1997. Short-term debt to total debt is the book
value of current financial debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt. The return on assets (ROA) is
the ratio of after-tax profit and interest to total assets. Aggregate ratios are obtained by summing the










 (Non Listed  companies)
ROA
 Belgium 0.60 0.57 0.61 0.04
 France 0.63 0.52 0.66 0.20
 Ireland 0.57 NA 0.57 0.05
 Italy 0.96 0.90 0.96 0.02
 Netherlands 0.43 0.19 0.50 0.06
 Portugal 0.54 0.64 0.54 0.02
 Spain 0.60 0.42 0.66 0.05
 United Kingdom 0.80 0.61 0.80 0.04Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES FOR FIRMS IN AMADEUS BY COUNTRY
Percentiles Belgium
(no. of firms : 149)
France
(no. of firms :
14541)
Ireland
(no. of firms :
183)
Italy
(no. of firms  :
7137)
Netherlands
(no. Of firms  :
925)
Portugal
(no. Of firms  :
584)
Spain
(no. of firms :
240)
United Kingdom
(no. of firms  :
10060)
1 % 3 4 5 4 2 10 2 4
5 % 5 10 9 10 5 21 9.5 11
10 % 12 20 18 15 14 32 16.5 21
25 % 24 42 39 30 43 72 32.5 51
50 % 102 91 99 65 114 136.5 88 125
75 % 476 206 196 138 254 268.5 168.5 273
90 % 1452 496 495 278 540 542 322.5 667
95 % 2771 904 638 444 877 892 541.5 1252
99 % 12537 3067 2933 1397 2233 2640 2820 4579Table 4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Non-weighted average and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the main variables in Amadeus. Sample: all firms in Amadeus
used for the econometric analysis from 1993 to 1997.
Belgium France Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK
Age 26.50 24.27 21.50 20.66 26.33 23.80 20.6 25.59
(22.09) (18.71) (16.80) (14.78) (22.26) (18.67) (15.5) (21.17)
Intangible assets
to fixed assets 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.028 0.01
(0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.068). (0.05)
Growth rate of
sales 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.12 -0.00 0.21 0.13 0.09
(0.58) (0.76) (0.44) (0.77) (0.76) (0.63) (0.82) (0.53)
 Growth rate of
value added -0.00 0.03 0.19 0.10 -0.03 0.11 NA 0.10
(0.50) (0.44) (0.54) (0.69) (0.44) (0.62) (0.56)
 ROA 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.06
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (4.92) (0.06) (0.09) (0.19)
 Short-term debt to
external funds 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.71 0.83 0.84 0.84
(0.25) (0.23) (0.26) (0.17) (0.32) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
 Leverage 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.52 0.59
(0.26) (0.23) (0.27) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24)Table 5
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT VARIABLES
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1999). The dummy ACCSTD is equal to 1 if the quality o
accounting standard is above the average of the sample of La Porta et al. (1998). CRED is the creditor protection
dummy, which is equal to 1 in high creditor protection countries. Countries are considered to have high protection
of creditors’ rights if they are above the average of the La Porta et al. (1998) sample. Stock and bond marke
capitalization are in ratio to GDP. The dummy BOND is equal to 1 in countries with high bond marke





























Ireland 8.74 57 0 1 0 NA 0 0.49
United
Kingdom 9.402 78 1 4 1 0.22 1 1.31
French Origin
Belgium 9 61 1 2 1 0.01 0 0.46
France 9.486 69 1 0 0 0.11 0 0.39
Italy 7.946 62 1 2 1 0.03 0 0.21
Netherlands 9.866 64 1 2 1 0.35 1 0.99
Portugal 7.806 36 0 1 0 0.06 0 0.23
Spain 7.87 64 1 2 1 0.02 0 0.43Table 6
THE DETERMINANTS OF LEVERAGE
Leverage is regressed on proxies for firm reputation  (age), size (logarithm of the number of employees), the
degree of intangibility of assets, measured by the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INTANG), the
growth rate of sales (GSALES), profitability (ROA) and non-debt-tax-shields (NDTS). To identify the effect
across countries, various dummies are introduced and interacted with the independent variables. All dummies
are described in Table 5. CRED is the creditor protection dummy. The English origin dummy is equal to 1 for
countries whose legal rule is of English origin (UK and Ireland). Estimates of the equation for leverage are
calculated by applying ordinary least squares estimates to the pooled sample (OLS) and by introducing firm
dummies (fixed effects estimates).
OLS Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Log(age) -0.010 -0.030 -0.030 -0.30 -0.026
(-2.86) (-4.68) (-4.63) (-4.62) (-3.978)
 Log(age)
2 -0.008 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.015
(-11.30) (-9.87) (-10.912) (-10.10) (-7.444)
 Log(age) 
2* bond 0.003 0.019 0.019 0.019
(20.25) (9.81) (9.974) (10.17)
 Log (employees) -0.001 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(-2.58) (11.62) (11.55) (11.56) (11.88)
 INTANG -0.354 -0.278 -0.029 -0.16 -0.13
(-23.667) (-10.198) (-1.945) (-7.63) (-7.387)
 INTANG * CRED * ACCSTD 0.376 0.263
(16.63) (7.243)
 INTANG * ACCSTD 0.163
(1.083)
 INTANG *English origin 0.115
(2.94)
 GSALES -0.024 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.0018
(-12.58) (3.574) (3.59) (3.49) (-2.19)
 GSALES * stock market capitalization
0.034 -0.011 -0.101 -0.010
(12.14) (-5.74) (-5.882) (-5.62)
 ROA -0.598 -0.355 -0.355 -0.355 -0.35
(-71.48) (-53.06) (-53.1) (-53.08) (-52.845)
 NDTS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.76) (-1.28) (-1.27) (-1.28) (-1.294)
 Constant 0.685 0.743 0.74 0.745 0.73
(128.72) (80.57) (80.27) (80.27) (79.649)






2 =0.05    Table 7
LEVERAGE AND GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES
Leverage is regressed on proxies for firm reputation (age), size (logarithm the number of
employees), the degree of intangibility of assets, measured by the ratio of intangible assets to total
assets (INTANG), the growth rate of value added, profitability (ROA) and non-debt-tax-shields
(NDTS). To identify the effect across countries various dummies are introduced and interacted with
the independent variables. All dummies are described in Table 5. CRED is the creditor protection
dummy. The English origin dummy is equal to 1 for countries whose legal rule is of English origin
(UK and Ireland). Estimates of the equation for leverage are calculated by introducing firms








Checking for the endogeneity
of growth opportunities
(3)
 Log(age) -0.012 0.018 -0.04
(-1.75) (1.605) (-6.49)
 Log(age)
2 -0.034 -0.048 -0.013
(-15.01) (-13.49) (-6.61
 Log(age) 
2* bond 0.026 0.046 0.007
(12.42) (8.00) (4.28)
 Log (employees) 0.015 0.0115 0.014
(12.33) (6.01) (12.51)
 INTANG -0.30 -0.30 -0.26
(-10.65) (-9.15) (-9.04)
 INTANG * CRED * ACCSTD 0.283 0.23 0.34
(7.29) (3.339) (8.93)
 Growth rate of value added 0.015 0.00 -0.02
(11.34) (0.16) (-9.4)
 Growth rate of value added * stock
market capitalization -0.013 -0.039 0.014
(-7.63) (-7.75) (4.62)




 ROA -0.462 -0.56 -0.016
(-51.65) (-35.48) (-11.3)
 NDTS 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.21) (-0.13) (0.75)
 Constant 0.795 0.869 0.733
79.27 (54.95) (82.25)





ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS FOR LEVERAGE
Leverage is regressed on proxies for firm reputation  (age), size (logarithm of the number of employees), the
degree of intangibility of assets, measured by the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INTANG), the
growth rate of sales, profitability (ROA) and non-debt-tax-shields (NDTS). To identify the effect across
countries, various dummies are introduced and interacted with the independent variables. All dummies are
described in Table 5. CRED is the creditor protection dummy. Estimates of the equation for leverage have been








 Log(age) -0.015 -0.072 -0.008
(-4.13) (-2.50) (-1.87)
 Log(age)
2 -0.007 0.005 -0.007
(-9.46) (0.96) (-9.99)
 Log(age) 
2* bond 0.003 0.002 0.002
(17.155) (1.28) (12.48)
 Log(employees) -0.001 0.024 0.000
(-2.62) (9.97) (-1.318)
 INTANG -0.36 0.004 -0.350
(-24.05) (0.05) (-23.58)
 INTANG * CRED * ACCSTD 0.384 -0.023 0.51
(16.774) (-0.15) (21.49)
 Growth rate of sales -0.026 0.01 -0.007
(-13.23) (0.8) (3.49)
 Growth rate of sales * stock market
capitalization 0.036 -0.015 0.008
(12.66) (0.527) (2.16)
 ROA -0.596 -0.528 -0.046
(-70.46) (-10.405) (-20.117)
 NDTS -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-0.69) (-0.35) (3.535)
 Constant 0.690 0.49 0.656
(128.62) (11.1) (118.69)





REGRESSIONS FOR LEVERAGE BY FIRM SIZE
AND FOR FIRMS IN “ADVANCED SECTORS”
Leverage is regressed on proxies for firm reputation  (age), size (logarithm the number of employees), the
degree of intangibility of assets, measured by the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INTANG), the
growth rate of sales (GSALES), profitability (ROA) and non-debt-tax-shields (NDTS). To identify the effect
across countries various dummies are introduced and interacted with the independent variables. All dummies
are described in Table 5. CRED is the creditor protection dummy. Estimates of the equation for leverage have


















 Log(age) -0.05 -0.021 0.013 0.063 -0.046
(4.212) (-1.85) (0.86) (2.00) (-5.59)
 Log(age)
2 -0.023 -0.030 -0.034 -0.047 -0.019
(-5.90) (-8.48) (-6.29) (-4.27) (-7.049)
 Log(age) 
2* bond 0.025 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.030
(7.26) (4.04) (2.56) (1.38) (11.76)
 Log(employees) 0.027 0.046 0.060 0.06 0.013
(8.84) (10.31) (9.28) (5.55) (9.61)
 INTANG -0.33 -0.35 -0.25 -0.21 -0.398
(-5.92) (-6.28) (-4.13) (-0.906) (-9.323)
 INTANG * CRED * ACCSTD 0.226 0.34 0.247 0.067 0.31
(2.93) (4.83) (3.14) (0.275) (5.24)
 Growth rate of sales 0.010 0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.009
(4.41) (1.7) (1.86) (-0.327) (5.48)












 ROA -0.395 -0.346 -0.35 -0.29 -0.395
(-29.42) (-32.14) (-25.16) (-12.00) (-42.44)
 NDTS 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(1.41) (-1.97) (1.615) (1.32) (-1.51)
 Constant 0.773 0.650 0.470 0.33 0.744
(53.44) (29.32) (11.55) (3.38) (62.62)






2 =0.059           Table 10
THE DETERMINANTS OF DEBT MATURITY
The dependent variable is defined as short-term financial debt to external funds. Time dummies and















 Leverage -0.2 -0.2 -0.18 -0.013 -0.641
(-7.8) (-8.045) (-15.1) (-3.96) (-4.608)
 Volatility at time t 0.106 0.0016 0.082 0.24 0.428
(2.108) (1.143) (-3.6) (12.92) (0.924)
 Cred * volatility at time t -0.104 -0.038 -0.231 -0.482
(-2.08) (-3.427) (-13.14) (-1.024)
 Fixed assets / total assets -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.217 -0.21
(-37.33) (-37.07) (-7.79) (-15.07) (-4.9)
 Tangible assets / fixed assets -0.099 -0.099 -0.18 -0.086 -0.054
(-8.67) (-14.605) (-12.00) (-16.31) (-0.848)







ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS
The dependent variable is the coefficient of the firms’ dummies in the equation for
leverage and debt maturity, respectively. Sectoral dummies have been included in
the regression. The t-statistics are presented among brackets and the number in
bold characters is the beta-coefficient, which measures the economic significance
of the estimates.
“Core Leverage” “Core Maturity”
 Listed Companies -0.06 -0.12
-0.03 -0.10
(-5.747) (-16.776)
 Enforcement 0.04 -0.24
0.11 -0.92
(4.104) (-2.905)
 Creditor Rights Protection Index 0.03 -0.09
0.24 -0.28
(8.47) (-1.92)
 Stock Market Capitalization to GDP -0.27 0.34
-0.56 1.03
(-12.3) (3.655)
 Banking System Concentration -0.2 0.64
-0.12 0.53
(-6.41) (1.983)
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